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I was twenty-six when I first drove through the heavily guarded gates of the FBI Academy on Marine 
Corps Base, Quantico.  After four months of training, I was sent into the field to conduct investigations 
as an FBI Special Agent.  This work afforded me valuable, eye-opening experiences, but I ultimately left 
government service for academic philosophy—in part to try to better make sense of the role of law 
enforcement in liberal societies.   
 
I was interested in the extent to which executive norms have changed and continue to change.  The 
shift in norms has happened slowly, at many times and for many reasons. The Internet and tech 
booms—paving the way for new forms of electronic surveillance—predated 9/11 by several years, 
while the police’s vast use of secret informants and sanctioned law-breaking activity began well before 
that.  
 
In one sense, many of these issues culminated in 2017 when the President of the United States fired 
the Director of the FBI—raising questions about the rule of law and whether the FBI was a mere 
instrument of political whim.  But our history illuminates a much broader problem in both government 
generally and policing specifically:  From top to bottom, executive authority and discretionary power 
have grown to such a degree that it has trended toward illiberal practices and policies.  This is not a 
local problem or a party problem.  It is a problem about the legal, political, and philosophical norms of 
democracies in the liberal tradition.  
 
I tried to embrace a principled methodology when I began exploring these problems as a book project 
[The Retrieval of Liberalism in Policing (Oxford, 2019)].  There are of course many fruitful approaches 
that one might pursue, but I settled upon transitional nonideal theory.  This means that one must make 
assumptions about the minimum requirements of a broad ideal theory of justice, which allows one to 
address actual problems of injustice (nonideal theory) in a way that transitions toward the ideal. 
 
Of course, “liberalism” and the “liberal tradition” mean different things to different people and it can 
be difficult to define the liberal ideal neutrally (consider “classical liberalism,” “neoliberalism,” “liberal 
feminism,” “liberal egalitarianism,” and so on).   However, the various ways that people think about 
the basic tenets of the liberal tradition in political and legal philosophy do have overlapping features—
features that make a liberal theory liberal (e.g., equality, freedom, the rule of law). 
 
These features give rise to a basic conception of persons that constrains nonideal theorizing about 
injustice.  My book develops a tripartite conception of liberal personhood, with the first two facets—
reciprocator (having to do with one’s equal legal and social status) and moral agent (having to do with 
one’s capacity for certain natural properties that allow one to be treated as free and responsible)—
giving rise to the third facet, human dignity (which has both a social and moral component).  
 
There are a variety of ways that law enforcement policies and the pursuit of security may count as an 
affront to the basic tenets of liberalism and liberal personhood.  In recent years, much attention has 
been focused upon police brutality in places such as the United States.  Most people agree that 
brutality is a clear example of police power that has exceeded its moral limits.  There is often no 
difficult moral question to address in such cases because there is simply no legitimate excuse when 
government agents denigrate one’s dignity and break the law. 
 
Other questions about the limits of executive power are not so straightforward.  Consider the police’s 
pervasive use of informants, sanctioned law-breaking, and electronic surveillance.  It is surprising that 
so little attention has been given to spelling out just where the moral limits of this sort of power lie.  
 
Some informants are tasked by the police to engage in risky undercover operations when the police 
have leverage over the informant (e.g., the police have evidence that the informant committed a 
crime).  The bargaining process involved in such agreements resembles the bargaining process 
associated with (unconscionable) contracts. Procedurally, informants may have no real choice about 
whether to accept the police’s terms, nor may they have adequate knowledge of the risks involved in 
the undercover operation.  Substantively, the terms of such agreements may unduly weigh in favor of 
the police and constitute an affront to the informant’s liberal personhood.   
 
Or consider the police’s authority to break the law in order to enforce the law (what the FBI calls 
“otherwise illegal activity,” or “OIA”).  There are no doubt instances in which OIA is necessary—
emergencies in which there is a risk of death or serious bodily harm come to mind.  But one might 
think that we should examine the limits of OIA more closely, lest we slide farther from rule of law 
principles.  John Locke’s notion of “prerogative power”—as well as historic case law regarding 
constraints upon the Executive’s authority to break the law—are worth revisiting.   
 
Law enforcement use of electronic surveillance is also a pressing concern today.  However, worries 
about surveillance can lead to amorphous questions about the nature of privacy.  The difficulty is in 
part based upon the fact that personal and societal privacy norms have changed in recent years.  The 
larger problem is that an undue focus upon the idea of privacy may distract us from the underlying 
issue of the police’s surveillance discretion.  For example, if the scope of the police’s discretionary 
power to engage in OIA (noted above) is unjustified, then surveillance associated with that OIA might 
also be construed as unjustified because it stems from unjustified OIA. Such surveillance can thus be 
described as an indirect rule of law departure inasmuch as it is fruit of the poisonous OIA tree.  
 
Louis Brandeis’s dissent in the case, Olmstead v. United States (1928), seems especially prescient 
today:  “In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the 
law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the 
whole people by its example. . . . If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; 
it invites every man to become a law unto himself.”  History tells us that security and the rule of law 
have never been balanced perfectly.  But perhaps it is time to more closely examine whether executive 
power—from presidents to policing—has exceeded its scope given the basic tenets of the liberal 
tradition.    
